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China’s Relations with Latin America:  







China’s presence in Latin America has been visible and active to the extent that it has raised 
growing concerns in the policy-making community in the United States. American concerns can be 
attributed to the lack of clarity about Chinese motivations. Although China proclaims its motives to be 
apolitical and all economics, however, it has been expanding the relations into such areas of concerns 
as in military and security areas in the name of “Third World” or “developing countries.” In addition, 
Chinese motives behind its desire to improve political ties with the regional states are justified with 
their shared outlook of the world from anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism to the needs for new 
international order. Until recently, China’s relations with Latin America had remained somewhat 
distant not only for geographical reasons, but also for political reasons. China’s isolation in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s kept the relationship literally idle, and the opening of the country emphasized development 
of relations with the West, thereby naturally neglecting the relations with developing countries 
including the Latin American states. To overcome this, China has employed a number of strategies (e.g. 
summit diplomacy, bilateral approaches, multilateral cooperation, and “going-out (zouchuqu).” These 
strategies prove that China’s relationship with Latin America are at a rebuilding stage, and that its 
influence in the region is still marginal. China’s growing presence will neither entail political or 
security ramifications to the region nor be a challenge to the US predominance yet.  
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China’s presence in Latin America is growing at an unprecedented pace. Notwithstanding 
long tradition of the relationship, it seems to have become much more visible in recent years. 
Whilst China’s increasingly visible presence in the region is claimed to be national interest-
driven with a heavy emphasis on economic aspect of it,1
                                                          
* The author would like to thank two unanimous reviewers for their valuable and constructive 
comments. 
 it is not viewed in the same way by 
others, especially the West led by the US. Rather, they are concerned with the intentions 
behind China’s growing engagement in these states and the regions. They deem Chinese 
move to be political and strategic, and not necessarily all economic (Lam 2004, Landau, 
2005). They base these claims on the grounds that it entails significant implications to the 
extant structure and order in the region. Moreover, their view has been endorsed by some 
1  Economic aspect of the bilateral relationship was emphasized, for instance, at the National 
Developing Countries Economic Diplomacy Working Conference headed by Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao, Remin Ribao (People’s Daily), September 3, 2004. Cited from Zhang Qing-min, “Zhongguo 
dui fanzhanzhong guojia zhengce de puju(The Distribution of Developing Countries in the Pattern of 
China’s Foreign Relations),” Waijiao Pinglun(Foreign Affairs Review), No. 94, February 2006, p. 25. 
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Chinese observers who seemingly understand the roots of such misunderstanding naturally 
taking place due to the unclearness of Chinese motives in increasingly active role in Latin 
America. 2
US obsession with China in Latin America stems from its continuous diplomatic practice 
based on so-called “Beijing consensus.” Washington is getting weary with China’s 
deepening engagement in its ‘backyard’ because the norms practiced in such diplomacy are 
more appealing to the regional states than those by the US. In pursuit of relations and 
interests in the region, Beijing has thus far not shown respect to, for instance, the economic 
sanctions imposed by the US on some of the regional states for human rights violation and 
other political reasons. China’s persistent efforts to engage with sanctioned states offer them 
leeway to sustain regimes that practice politics in contradiction of American values. In 
addition, by playing the China card, they can effectively hedge against the US, equipping 
them with a greater leverage over Washington. Furthermore, they have been able to turn 
around their debt-ridden economies into an economy faring a high growth rate for the first 
time in two decades, which is attributable to deepening economic relationship with China. 
While the Latin American states enjoy ensuing economic benefits from engaging with China, 
however, this does not automatically translate into deepening affection towards it. Their 
major industries (i.e. labor intensive ones) are seriously challenged, facing rising demand for 
structural change, and are confronted with rising unemployment rate as a result of it. Hence, 
whether deepening economic interdependence embodies the kind of security implications 
that the US would like to claim requires further scrutiny. 
 A salient argument in this regard is related to the prospect of China’s 
displacement of regional hegemon, i.e. US. Coincidently enough, the West has been vocal 
about such prospect at the very outset of Chinese diplomatic embarkation to the developing 
countries world beginning in the late 1990s. It has become deeply preoccupied with Chinese 
expeditions because of the velocity of Chinese penetration as well as the magnitude of its 
engagement displaying in this discourse. China’s fast growing presence and ensuing 
expansion of influence in Latin America is perceived to be a serious and direct challenge to 
the US predominance (Ellis 2005). 
From the Chinese perspectives, China’s recent emphasis on developing relations with 
developing states is not resultant of its political desire to displace any of the existing 
hegemon. Although China opposes hegemony and aspires for a world of equal in a 
multipolar structure, it has been quite successful restraining itself from being assertive or 
explicit about it in its diplomatic conduct. As emphasized over the years, China wants to 
uphold the status quo of the extant world order, and it has been working hard to preserve the 
peaceful environment it deems currently in place. Towards this end, China strives hard to 
project an image of a responsible state by embracing multilateralism in its diplomacy and 
respecting present norms and institutions at work. It has been an active participant in 
multilateral dialogues and negotiations so as to realize one of its primary security principles, 
i.e. peaceful settlement of international conflicts. Moreover, it tries at its best to demonstrate 
peaceful development orientation in its foreign policy for the new millennium. To 
demonstrate its commitment to such orientation, China recently adopted the idea of creating 
a ‘harmonious world’ as one of the major principles for its foreign policy.  
                                                          
2 Zheng Yongnian, “Zhongguo ‘zouchuqu’ ying you moshi(China urged to step carefully in developing 
countries as it becomes a world force)” Lianhe zaobao (Chinese Media Morning Services), February 
27, 2007, accessed online at http://www.zaobao.com/special/forum/pages5/forum_zp070227.html on 
January 14, 2008. 




The notion of ‘harmonious world’ is quite significant. It offers a principal guideline to the 
future direction of Chinese foreign behavior and policy. Its concept is a strategic innovation 
to further facilitate the backbone of China’s foreign policy principle, known as “Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.” Its aim is twofold. One is to further the precipitation of 
China’s desire to preserve world peace and stability by realizing harmony in a world of 
diversity, thereby serving the foremost goal of current Chinese foreign policy. Another aim is 
to materialize the practice of such principles as mutual benefit, equality, and non-interference 
of domestic affairs. In sum, respect to diversity in ideology, values, and system is a 
prerequisite to the realization of a harmonious world. This is probably where the seed for 
‘Beijing consensus’ is sowed. Nevertheless, China pursues a foreign policy with its own 
conviction and belief in such principles regardless the status of a state. How it is perceived 
by others does not seem to concern China as long as their relationship is deemed to be 
mutually beneficial and practiced on equal basis.  
Despite the longevity of the Five Principles, on which the idea of creating a harmonious 
world is founded, China has yet to win sufficient trust and confidence from predominant 
actors like the US regarding its recent diplomatic excursion into developing countries 
including Latin America. Although China gets a wide approval of being a late comer to 
international affairs, and therefore, it is an inevitable due course for China to become more 
deeply engaged in and integrated into the world system, at the same time, it raises a dire 
concern to major international actors. Their concern is simply arisen by the sense of 
uncertainty about where the rise of China will take it to, and the sense is deeply rooted in the 
theory of power transition. According to the theory, it will be inevitable for a state like China 
to challenge the primacy of the US in due time as a result of its ascendancy to a great power 
status underpinned by its accrued power from economic success and enhanced political 
influence.  
Hence, a set of critical questions follows: What has driven China’s growing presence in 
Latin America? Does it necessarily mean correlated rise in its influence in Latin America? If 
so, does it mean that China has the potential to become a threat to the US interests in the 
region? Is China’s policy to Latin America intened to act in such way? Is there any short-
term or long-term aspect to it? If so, what kind of impact will the implications of the 
respective end have on Latin America’s future relations with China and the US as wells as on 
the China-US relationship? To address these questions, it first requires a comprehensive, yet 
in-depth, understanding of China’s policy toward Latin America at two levels, i.e., domestic 
politics and foreign politics. Most of the literature on the subject is heavily approached from 
American or Western perspectives, focusing only on the phenomenal aspect of Chinese 
engagement discourse with the region, which has naturally led to a lack of substantial 
analysis on Chinese policy motivation, orientation, principles, strategies, and goals.  
Against this background, the article attempts to address China’s relations with Latin 
America in Chinese foreign policy context. It is comprised of three parts. It will first address 
the issues of Chinese interest concerning Latin America in the light of its policy towards 
developing countries. It will then proceed to analyze the strategies that China employs in 
pursuit of these interests in Latin America. It will conclude with implication notes inferred 
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2. ISSUES AT HAND AND CHINA’S INTERESTS 
 
During the Cold War period, issues concerning China’s interest in Latin America were 
basically oriented towards its political and security outlook. Although governments and 
political leaders of China and Latin America did not share the same ideology (e.g. 
communism), however, their political and security outlook were similar. Political values 
were understood and shared between China and many of the Latin American states because 
of the similarities in their political system and outlook. Many of the Latin American states 
were under either totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Others as a result of US influence, 
adopted western democratic political system. Regardless, both parties recognized themselves 
as Third World countries, whereby they were able to converge on many international issues. 
Their convergence basically laid a foundation of framework in which their relationship was 
found. Some of the major issues concerning both parties during this period were very much 
political.  
China and Latin American states were both once colonized and struggled hard to win 
independence. Hence, they both opposed colonialism and imperialism. Anti-imperialism 
found its place as one of the fundamental principles in their foreign policy. Because of their 
unyielding stance on imperialism, they naturally found anti-hegemonism to be a binding 
force behind their relationship. To capitalize their political independence in the realm of their 
foreign policy, China and Latin American states also shared a strong interest in pursuit of 
independent and autonomous foreign policy. In materializing this, they both actively 
participated in Non-alliance movement and the Group 77. They also strove hard in furthering 
their efforts towards the idea of creating a new international political and economic order. 
Economic interest remained secondary and marginal during this period. One of the most 
attributing factors was their economic conditions. Both China’s and Latin America’s 
economy was absent of common interests in part because they were underdeveloped and 
poor Third World economies. In addition, both economies did not have much to offer to each 
other in part because of similarities in their industrial structure. Moreover, the absence of 
formal diplomatic recognition between China and Latin American states was another salient 
impediment to the chance of developing economic relations in part because most of the states 
had diplomatic relationships with Taiwan. Latin America during the Cold War period was 
heavily influenced by the US as it intervened very much into domestic politics of Latin 
American states in the name of ‘Monroe doctrine.’  
This factor is self-evident in the normalization efforts on the part of Latin America only 
after US normalization efforts of its relations with China efforts were made explicit in the 
early 1970s. Throughout the rest of the Cold War period, Latin American economy heavily 
relied on the US market. The trend seems to be valid as Latin America still remains a 
secondary economic and commercial partner for China. In 2006, for instance, Latin America 
and the Caribbean states accounted for 3.7% of China’s exports and 4.3% of its imports. The 
total trade volume has been growing rapidly, with Chinese exports and imports up by 24.8% 
and 23.9%, respectively, from 1995 to 2006.3
With the end of the Cold War, coupled with the rapid processing of globalization and 
 
                                                          
3 Enrique Dussel Peters, “China’s Challenge to Latin America,” Project Syndicate, October 11, 2007, 
accessed online at http://www.project-syndicate.org/print_commentary/dussel3/English on November 
20, November 30 2007. 




deepening integration of world economy, China and Latin America would find renewed 
political and economic interests in each other.  
China’s interests in its relations with developing countries are multifaceted. There is a 
variety of issues concerning Chinese national interest. Most of all, developing countries 
embody the fundamental foreign policy outlook and values of Chinese foreign policy. China 
has long claimed itself as a Third World nation and the largest developing nation. China 
remains a part of Third World, and it is unthinkable to exclude itself from Third World 
(Jubany and Poon 2006: 4).4
Although China in recent years has been restraining from making explicit of its desire for 
a multipolar world, however, it is well represented in its policy towards Latin American, and 
well respected and accepted by Latin America states (Delamer, Malena, and Pom 2004: 79). 
In their official diplomatic documents such as joint statement and joint communiqué, it is 
well illustrated that both parties are committed to the idea of creating a multipolar world. 
They share the same perception on the causes of world poverty problem embedded in the 
unfair and unjust ways the current international economic order and system evolves. Hence, 
they often find common interests deeply shared in this particular cause and they conceive 
themselves as the crusaders with responsibilities to reduce the growing gap in the level of 
development between the developed and developing states. They both value the importance 
of South-North dialogue and South-South cooperation as a means to settle the economic 
disparity between the rich and poor.  
 Its economic development is not feasible when excluded. Its 
policy and policy goals, therefore, naturally fall in the same line with those of most of 
developing countries. Chinese policy on Latin America and developing countries shares the 
same policy goals in enhancing solidarity and cooperation, according to China’s Policy Paper 
on Latin America and the Caribbean published on November 5, 2008. To achieve this end, 
they both perceive anti-imperialism and anti-hegemonism as the fundamental principal goals 
of their foreign policy. Peaceful co-existence is the basic guiding norms of their international 
relations. Furthermore, they find unity and cooperation as the most viable measures for the 
realization of their common global political end: a new international order.  
Secondly, China’s interest in issues is awakened by the economic opportunities in 
developing countries and Latin America in particular. China’s international trade has 
expanded at a rapid pace. Trade has been the driving engine of its miraculous economic 
development. Given its ever-expanding international trade in terms of both sheer volume and 
market share, Chinese expansion into Latin America was naturally destined. Given the 
reciprocal nature of international trade, Latin America’s economic engagement with China 
also began to grow, largely for growing Chinese interest in Lain America’s economic merits: 
markets, natural resources, and raw materials. China values Latin American market not only 
for its potential but also for the progress it has made in the regionalization process. Moreover, 
their industrial and economic structure is viewed as to be mutually reinforcing and benefiting 
(Lu 2007: 62-3).  
After a long economic stagnation during the 1980s and 1990s, thought to be the result of 
their blind pursuit of neoliberalism directed by the US, Latin American economies began to 
rise again with the shift in its policy orientation from neoliberalism to government-led 
economic drive.5
                                                          
4 This notion was reiterated by current Chinese president Hu Jintao as he stressed that China “would 
forever stay on the side of developing countries.”  
 In 2004, for instance, the region recorded the highest growth rate of 5.5% 
5 Rising China’s influence in economic realm will have a spill-over effect in the security area as it will 
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for the first time in twenty years (Hakim 2006: 40). Success of the regional economy, on the 
one hand, is attributed to the deepening Chinese economic penetration with products of 
competitive prices as well as greater opening of the Chinese market to Latin America. 
Growing interdependence seems to have worked in favor of China who was able to retrieve 
regional states’ approval of ‘market economy’ status from larger regional economies such as 
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile in 2005.  
Granted major Latin American economies as a ‘market economy’ status, China 
seemingly wants to capitalize the opportunity to spearhead its advancement into the US 
market. Such a status is expected to pave the way for China to have an easier access to US 
market. The US is still has a lot of reservation about following a similar suit of Latin 
America on this matter in part because it wants to preserve the economic leverage over China 
that is guaranteed by not granting the status. Because China is not recognized as a ‘market 
economy,’ the US can adopt a variety of measures to control the imports of dumped Chinese 
products by claiming violation of fair and just trade practice. To overcome this obstacle, 
China values Latin American states and region as a gateway to American market as a result 
of their economic regionalization with the US. There is a growing trend in regional free trade 
efforts among the regional states and the US. Given that the trend is likely to persist in the 
foreseeable future, Latin American markets and economies will be much more deeply 
integrated into those of the US. Hence, China’s economic advancement into Latin America 
can benefit from this integration. Chinese products will enjoy a greater access to the US 
market by having an outlet in Latin America, which naturally facilitate the flow of Chinese 
goods into it. This has been well manifested in the increase of China’s share of total US 
imports, which rose from 3% in 1990 to 16% in 2006, whereas Latin America’s has not 
grown since 2000, standing still approximately at 17%.6
Thirdly, Latin America, for instance, is a world-class supplier of natural resources 
including energy resources and raw materials (Jiang 2006: 14).
 
7 China relies heavily on 
imports for copper, iron ore, and food grains. Its import dependence for energy resources is 
ever growing larger. Energy ties with Latin America have the dual benefits of an alternative 
source of supply as well as a bargaining power over other suppliers. China has long pursued 
to diversify its import source of energy, expanding from Russia to Central Asia to Africa. 
This diversification policy has helped China gain leverage over suppliers, thereby enhancing 
its bargaining power. With respect to Latin America’s potential as an export market, China 
has been proactive in pioneering Latin American markets. Its efforts have paid off large 
dividends. However modest the trade share is, 8
                                                          
undermine the traditional control imposed by the US and these critics argue that the United States is 
largely responsible for persistent problems. See Noam Chomsky, “Latin America and Asia Are at Last 
Breaking Free of Washington’s Grip,” The Guardian, March 15, 2006. 
 Latin America rapidly rose to become 
China’s fifth largest export market. In a similar vein, its second largest export market is now 
6 As a result, China replaced Mexico in 2003 as the second-leading exporter to the US in value terms 
after Canada. Peters, “China’s Challenge to Latin America,” Project Syndicate, Project Syndicate, 
October 11, 2007, accessed online at http://www.project-syndicate.org/print_commentary/dussel3/ 
English on November 20, November 30 2007. 
7 According to Wenran Jiang, China’s imports of Latin American oil in 2003 merely stood at 1 percent 
of its total imports and just above 3 percent in 2005.  
8 As of 2006, Latin America represents 3.7 percent of China’s total exports and 4.3 percent of its total 
imports. 




China. Furthermore, bilateral economic relationship have also been mutually benefiting to 
both parties. From the Chinese perspectives, it gives leeway for its energy diplomacy. From 
the Latin American perspective, relations with China has constructively contributed to its 
economic development, generating the highest growth rate in two decades in 2004. 
Furthermore, it has been strategically benefiting both parties. While Latin America finds 
China as an alternative to the recent US reduction of economic aid and assistance, China can 
use Latin America’s free trade relations with the US as a gateway to the US market. 
Lastly but not least, Latin America remains a litmus test of Chinese diplomatic 
competition against Taiwan. It is a region with a number of states that maintain diplomatic 
relationship with Taiwan. Of the thirty-three regional states, twelve recognize Taiwan as a 
sovereign state, a diplomatic challenge to ‘one China policy’ in the eyes of Beijing. Although 
the degree of concern has diminished on China’s part, Beijing does not want to see other 
states to shift their stance towards Taiwan. In other words, as long as the status quo regarding 
recognition of Taiwan is maintained, China is not, and will not be, provoked. Furthermore, 
China will make its utmost efforts to prevent others from deviating to Taiwan. China’s 
current satisfaction with the status quo of diplomatic struggle against Taiwan is difficult to 
explain. In many analyses and work, Chinese experts still emphasize the Taiwan issue as an 
important issue in China’s relations with Latin America. Nevertheless, Beijing’s official 
position is no longer nuanced in such ways. For instance, while Beijing leaders admit the 
significance of the issue, they are not proactive, but rather reactionary, in their posture (Davis 
2007: 20). Given the seemingly reactionary nature of Beijing’s perception on the issue, 
China has not actively undertaken the initiative to pressure the regional states that have 
effective diplomatic relationship with Taiwan to break it off. When it did take the initiatives, 
it was always in reaction to Taiwan’s assertive ‘money diplomacy’ for official recognition.  
 
 
3. CHINA’S POLICY: “BASED ON POLITICS, PURSUE ECONOMICS  
(YI ZHENGZHI SHANG JIE JINGJI)” 
 
Since its foundation in 1949, China has valued the importance of Third World, now 
dubbed as “developing countries,” for both sentimental and strategic reasons. It has long 
harbored a strong sentimental bond with their common historical experiences with colonial 
rulings and subsequent struggle for independence. In addition, as a late comer to the 
international system, China and the Third World countries were compelled to cooperate in 
their search for a position in the system. They o managed to do this beginning in the 1950s 
with Bandung Conference for Asia-African states where the so-called “Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence” was declared and accepted as the core principle of Third World 
foreign policy. Following the Conference, China and the Third World would continue 
together their struggle against the superpowers in a hope to create a new world order founded 
on a more equality, fairness, and just basis. Their efforts were visible with the foundation of 
such international fora as Group 77, also known as the Non-aligned states movements, and 
the most recent one being G-22. Moreover, they have been persistent in their efforts to 
continue the talks of the North-South with hopes to realize their shared goals of settling the 
growing gap between the developed and developing states. 
Third World was strategically appreciated by China during the Cold War period. After 
China separated itself from the socialist camp led by the former Soviet Union in the late 
1950s, it found itself in isolation. While in isolation, it was still in pursuit of diplomatic 
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struggle against Taiwan for its ‘one China policy’ as well as displacement of Taiwan from 
international organization as the legitimate representative of “China.” Cognizant of vast 
potential for political support lying in the growing number of Third World countries and the 
potential for the number to grow following independence, China became highly appreciative 
of the strategic and diplomatic value of the Third World. At a time when China’s security 
was perceived to be vulnerable to the possibility of another world war by the intensifying 
cold war between the two superpowers, Third World was viewed as a crucial force to their 
causes. They were a critical weight in maintaining the equilibrium in the balance of power 
between the two. In a similar vein, they were indispensible in Chinese strategic thinking as 
part of the so-called ‘United Front,’ a strategy that facilitated a coalition against the 
‘imperial’ powers. In the past, such coalition acted as an effective deterrence against the 
expansion of limited war.  
Nonetheless, once highly appreciative Chinese attitude to Third World would undergo a 
significant change as China decided to pursue economic reforms and the open-door policy in 
1978. China’s economic modernization-oriented policy had a spillover effect into its foreign 
policy realm. As its national orientation would shift from politics and ideology to economics 
and pragmatism, China’s foreign policy soon adapted to this shift as well. It was imperative 
for China to emancipate its foreign policy from ideological constraints and from its external 
dependency on financial and technology assistance. At the time China adopted economic 
modernization program, China was very much in shortage of human capital, and capital, 
technology, and other sources of materials and goods for economic development after years 
of economic isolation. China attempted to maintain balance in its relations with the 
developed and developing countries in the early phase of reform period, however, it did not 
last for long. Instead, as China’s relations with the developed states further progressed, 
especially with the West, China naturally became more negligent of Third World in its 
diplomacy. 
China’s opportunity to amend its relations with the Third World came when it was on the 
verge of diplomatic isolation following its brutal suppression of demonstrators at the 
Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June of 1989. While China was subject to economic 
sanctions by the West, it received sympathy from the fellow followers of the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Co-existence. It was then that China re-recognized the political value of Third 
World which would enable Beijing to confirm the primacy of domestic stability and peace 
over any other conditions for modernization. Given the external support it needed to confirm 
and consolidate its new leadership, Beijing immediately responded by allocating more 
attention and assistance to the Third World. China’s desire to enhance relationship will 
perpetuate the rest of the 1990s and in the new millennium.  
Beginning in the late 1990s Chinese leadership launched a diplomatic offense to 
developing countries. Successive visits by the top leaders underscored Beijing’s such desire. 
The importance of the relationship with developing countries has ever since then been well 
inscribed in official documents, especially in the annual working reports delivered to the 
National People’s Congress as well as the Communist Party Congress. It is widely claimed 
that China’s resurging interest in the relationship with developing countries is coincident 
with its rising import demand for natural resources and raw materials to sustain its fast 
growing economy. Ironically enough, China would become an oil product importer in 1993 
and a net oil importer in 1997. As a result of rapid urbanization and desertification of arable 
lands, food supply had to be outsourced mainly to developing countries. High economic 
growth rate naturally necessitates an increase in imports of raw materials. Hence, China’s 




developing countries diplomacy is often dubbed as energy diplomacy or economic 
diplomacy. 
Cognizant of the vast economic opportunities in developing countries and Latin America 
in particular, Beijing leadership began to emphasize their importance in the nation’s foreign 
policy. Their recognition is underscored in official documents. Official documents known as 
“Working Report (gongzuo baogao)” delivered to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and 
the Chinese Communist Party Congress (CCPC) are the reflection of the founding 
foundation of Chinese foreign policy, encompassing the principles, orientation, interests, and 
outlook. Changes in China’s policy to Latin America were self-evident in these documents. 
Beginning with 1999 “Working Report” to the National People’s Congress (NPC), for 
instance, developing countries surpassed other regions and countries (i.e. neighboring states 
and developed countries) in the order of importance, implying the rise in priority of these 
states in Chinese foreign policy.9
While the Chinese government emphasizes the priority of relationship with developing 
countries,  the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not necessary agree with such an 
outlook. In the “Working Reports” to the Party Congress since 1997, the order has been 
subject to change according to the external developments and changes. In 1997, in the eyes 
of the Party, developing countries was mentioned second to neighboring states; in 2002, 
following developed countries and neighboring states; and in 2007, rising to the top again. 
As can be seen, the strategic importance of developing countries can be analyzed by how it is 
prioritized in the foreign policy outlook in the government and party’s working report. 
 Developing countries are mentioned before neighboring 
and developed countries for the first time since the opening of China in 1978. The trend 
continued until 2003 when the new session of the 10th NPC was held.  
In light of China’s foreign policy orientation, principle, strategy, and interest, developing 
countries are critical. Apart from the traditional strategic values China has embodied in its 
Latin American policy, new dimensions have been added. In terms of orientation, shared 
opportunities for development and co-counter of challenges were put forward as a new 
orientation. At the devastating aftermath of 9.11, anti-terrorism (fan kongbu zhuyi) was 
promulgated as additional top national security concern. It was manifested in the passing of 
“Anti-terrorism law” in December 2001, and National Anti-Terrorism Working Cooperation 
Leading Small Group (guojia fan kongbu gongzuo xietiao lingdao xiaozu) in 2004 (Pan 
Guang 2004: 100).10
During the early years of reform and open-door policy, Beijing highly emphasized the 
need to focus on the relationships with the West. Against the economic sanctions the West 
imposed in 1989, China saw neighboring states as a breakthrough. Neighboring states were 
 An additional dimension to Chinese foreign policy was brought in with 
renewed emphasis on multilateral cooperation based on multilateralism. Economic security 
interests were further incorporated into China’s foreign policy as a result of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. The crisis led the Chinese leadership to realize the vitality of 
economic security to the peace and social well-being of the nation as well as other regional 
states. Hence, China’s perception on the priority of regions and nations naturally underwent a 
substantial change. 
                                                          
9 “Gongzuo baogao (Working Report)” delivered by Prime Minister Zhu Rongji at the second session 
of the 9th National People’s Congress on March 17, 1999, accessed online at http://www.people.com. 
cn/zgrdxw/zlk/rd/9jie/newfiles/b1130.html accessed on June 23, 2006. 
10 Zhongguo <fan kongbu fa> huzhi yuchu, Xingbian luntan, September 1, 2005, accesed online at 
http://www.xingbian.cn/template/article.jsp?ID=5760&CID=481433258 on June 25, 2006. 
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faring well economically and yet many of them retained official diplomatic or economic ties 
with China at the time. Manipulating their desire for economic opportunities in China, 
Beijing formally recognized these states and replaced them as an alternative source for 
economic help. As China’s fast growing economy demanded more raw materials and energy 
resources, China naturally turned toward developing states and replaced them in the top in its 
order of external relations priorities in 1999, evident in the Working Report delivered that 
year.  
Notwithstanding the long history of good-will and friendly relationship, China did not 
truly appreciate the strategic value that Latin America until 1999. Although it was in 1996 
when the then Chinese president Jiang Zemin, would visit Latin America for the first time in 
post-Deng Xiaoping era, it took an additional three years for China to present a set of 
principles that would guide its relations with Latin America well into the new millennium.  
China’s policy towards Latin America extends from its overall developing countries 
policy (fazhanzhong guojia zhengce). It was proclaimed in 2004 when China held a national 
economic diplomacy working conference on developing countries (chuanguo dui 
fazhanzhong guojia jingji waijiao gongzuo huiyi). The policy was announced by Premier 
Wen Jiabao. Recognizing the importance of economic diplomacy towards Latin America, the 
guiding principle should be upholding “mutual respect, equal treatment, promotion of 
economics via politics, integration of politics and economics, mutual benefit and treatment, 
co-development, diversified forms, and emphasis on actual effect.”11
Hence, China’s policy priority lies in political relationship that is based on mutual respect 
and equal treatment. Political relationship is also the fundamental prerequisite for economic 
relations. Put simply, politics is a precondition for economics. It can be interpreted that 
politics will guarantee and lead China to the improvement of economic relationship with 
Latin America. Furthermore, in the framework of economic relations based on politically-
bound relationship, China and Latin America’s mutual trust and confidence will be enhanced. 
In the same vein, mutual benefit will increase between the two parties. Therefore, in China’s 
policy towards Latin America, it can be said that economics is embodied in politics.  
 
China’s Latin American goals were pronounced during president Hu Jintao’s visit to four 
Latin American states. There are basically three of them. First, through mutual political 
support, China and Latin America will become all-weather friends. Second, mutually 
complementary economics is the starting point for their win-win co-operative partnership. 
Third, enhanced cultural exchange will be an example for how different civilizations can 





China’s approach to Latin America is carried out strategically because it is political. As 
indicated above, China prioritizes political relations above anything else. A sound political 
relationship is a precondition to the relationships in other sectors. Economic relationship, for 
instance, is premised upon friendly political relations. Cultural exchange can be facilitated by 
                                                          
11 Peters, “China’s Challenge to Latin America,” Project Syndicate, October 11, 2007, accessed online 
at http://www.project-syndicate.org/print_commentary/dussel3/English on November 20, November 
30 2007. 




stable political relations; China’s ‘soft power’ will otherwise be viewed as vigilant.12 Hence, 
ever since Chinese leadership began to emphasize the value of relationship with Latin 
America in the late 1990s, it was they themselves who took the initiative to pursue political 
relationship with regional states. During this pursuit, Chinese approaches were revealed, and 
from this, Chinese strategies can be inferred. At the outset of development of the relationship, 
Chinese top leaders called for summit meetings with Latin American counterparts. While 
they toured regional states, they would basically discuss and negotiate their interests at the 
bilateral level. Following the success of bilateral talks whereby China succeeded in winning 
the trust and confidence of those they met, its strategy eventually shifted towards multilateral 
approaches. 13
 
 However, multilateral diplomacy is not new. China has already long been 
engaged in multilateral engagement with Latin American states as a part of its Third World 
diplomacy. Upon the foundation of political relationship, China furthers its relations in other 
areas. A salient strategy applied in the economic realm is ‘zouchuqu (going out)’ strategy.  
4.1. Summit diplomacy 
 
Summit diplomacy in Chinese diplomatic conduct is a recent phenomenon. It has become 
one of the most reliable strategies for initiating a relationship. While Chinese top leaders 
travel to meet their foreign counterparts, they extend their invitations in return. Hence, 
summit meeting is reciprocal. It is also effective in pioneering or amending or improving or 
developing relations. It is usually followed with a framework in which the direction and 
orientation of the prospective relationship are guided. Based on the consensus and agreement 
drawn by their top leaders, nations will seek to co-operate on agreed terms in the form of 
follow-up measures at the working level. When these measures are enforced and enacted, 
non-governmental sectors will be called up for the implementation.  
Chinese summit diplomacy with Latin America remained somewhat idle for historical 
reason (e.g. Cultural Revolution) and Beijing’s emphasis on the relationship with the West 
during the first decade of the reform period. Although the importance of Third World was 
renewed in Chinese foreign policy in the early 1980s, it was only temporary. As evident in 
the records, exchanges between top leaders of China and Latin American states would peak 
in 1985 and dissipate thereafter (Dreyer 2006: 87).14
                                                          
12 Mohan Malik, “China’s Growing Involvement in Latin America,” The Power and Interest News 
Report (PINR), June 12, 2006, accessed online at http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_ 
printable&report_id=508&la... on July 4, 2006. 
 It will not be until after 1989 Chinese 
leaders would initiate political contacts with the Latin American counterparts. Once 
seemingly indifferent China’s policy towards Latin America had been turned around by the 
economic sanction imposed by the West. In addition, “the consequences of globalization and 
its link to domestic economics” led “countries that previously had little or no mutual contact 
to seek greater ties” (Mora 1999: 92). Hence, the expansion of ties between China and Latin 
America both had domestic and international rationale. In 1992, the then president Yang 
Shangkun visited Latin American states and presented four principles for the bilateral 
13  The Chinese side is particularly driven by the hopes of making constructive steps toward the 
elimination of misunderstandings and the building of trust. “China-US Latin America talks increase 
trust,” Xinhua, April 14, 2006.  
14 Zhao paid a “goodwill visit” to Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. “The trip was billed as 
the turning of a new page” in the history of bilateral relationship between China and Latin America.  
JAE-WOO CHOO 12 
 
relations, thereby opening a new chapter for the relationship (He 1998: 101). These 
principles included: (1) friendly cooperative relations; (2) bilateral economic, trade, 
technology relations; (3) mutual respect; and (4) new international order (He 1998: 102). 
Following the groundbreaking visit by Yang, a series of successive visits by Chinese leaders 
to Latin America took place. President Jiang Zimin took a tour in 1993,  Premier Li Peng 
visited twice in 1995 and 1996, and Jiang made his last trip in the decade in 1999.  
Coming into the 21st century, Chinese leaders sustained their summit diplomacy with 
Latin America. In 2001, then president Jiang Zimin made his last official trip of his tenure 
(1993-2002) to four regional states. After succeeding Jiang in 2003, the fourth generation 
leader Hu Jintao did not hesitate to follow his predecessor in visiting the region (six states, to 
be specific) in November of the following year. Hu’s visit was considered historic because it 
paved way to enhanced strategic understanding between China and Latin America, improved 
trust and confidence, and consequently led to mutual understanding on the importance of 
exchange to a new level.15
 
 One of the most prominent achievement Hu retrieved from his 
visit was the winning of Beijing’s coveted designation of market economy status from some 
of the largest economies in the region, namely Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. In return, 
from 1996 to 2000, 8 presidents, 3 governor-generals, and 3 prime ministers from Latin 
America visited China.  
4.2. Bilateral approaches 
 
China has a set of goals in its bilateral approaches to regional states at all levels including 
the summit. The most outstanding goal is to revive once seemingly withered political ties by 
all means, and particularly by summit meeting. China has been successful in this endeavor 
through a cultivation of the concept ‘partnership’ in its relationships with them. By labeling 
them as states in partnership, not only is China able to evoke traditional notion of bilateral 
negotiation in its approaches in securing vital national interests, which is still China’s 
preference over multilateral, but it can also pave the way for the strengthening of the 
relationship at the bilateral level. The latter is pursued further to serve the interests of 
prominent Chinese diplomatic principles such as the Five Principle of Peaceful Co-existence. 
As these five principles are founded in reciprocity and mutuality, China still regards bilateral 
approaches to be the most effective diplomatic approach to its national interests overseas. 
With such conviction, it has become an ‘open secret’ that China prefers this approach over 
others including multilateral one. In its active pursuit of interests in Latin America, China’s 
strategy of bilateral approach was further emphasized. China has thus far succeeded with this 
approach by successfully capitalizing on the concept of partnership in promoting its relations 
with the Latin American states. 
Argentina moved up the ladder of partnership at a much faster pace. It was first, for 
instance, recognized as a “cooperative partner” as June of 2004. During Hu’s state visit in 
November 2004, it was ‘promoted’ to be a “strategic partner.” The fast changing character of 
the bilateral relationship, according to some analyses, is attributed to the result of 
Argentina’s convey of a greater willingness for political collaboration with China 
(Dominguez: 23). Venezuela was endowed with “friendly cooperative relations” upon former 
                                                          
15 Zhang Mingde, “2004nian lamei xingshi he zhongla guanxi (Latin America’s situation in 2004 and 
China-Latin America relations),” Zhuanjia taolun (Experts Forum) March 31, 2005, accessed online 
at http://www.ciis.org.cn/item/2005-03-31/50906html on August 19, 2005. 




president Jiang’s visit in April 2001. It would take only a month after the bestowment of this 
label that China upgraded the bilateral relationship to “strategic partner” during Venezuelan 
president Chavez’s visit to Beijing.   
Other major goals are: (1) to gain recognition of full market status; (b) to secure the raw 
materials it needs and to diversify the sources in order to reduce the country’s vulnerability; 
(c) to maintain a high level of access to the market in order to assure the exports of its 
dynamic manufactured products (He 2007: 840-1). A key objective is to win recognition as a 
market economy. Economic ties based on improved political relationship have been 
manifested in the rapid increase of trade volume and investment. China’s trade with the 
region in 1975, for instance, stood at mere $200 million. After thirty years in 2006, the total 
trade volume exceeded $70 billion. What is noteworthy is that a great portion of this was 
achieved between 2000 and 2006 when the bilateral trade increased by over 500 percent (He 
2007: 842). After all, China has become the second largest importer behind the US of the 
region’s commodities and goods. Given the persistent growth rate of trade (e.g. 38 percent) 
witnessed in recent years, it is expected that the volume will easily surpass $100 billion mark 
by 2010. 
How the improved political ties had a spillover effects in other aspects of the bilateral 
relationship between China and Latin America is summarized in the following bilateral cases. 
With Brazil, unlike other cases, the political impact on the economic realm in particular 
has been much more visible. Since Brazil received strategic partnership in 1993 when the 
then president Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to visit China, the bilateral 
relationship burgeoned upon a solid political foundation (Wu 2005: 13). In 2002, China 
surpassed Japan as Brazil’s largest trade partner in Asia. In 2004, as the bilateral trade 
exceeded $12 billion, and by quintupling from 2000 and 2004, China became Brazil’s fourth 
most important trade partner. Brazil supplies 30 percent of China’s total soybean imports and 
16 percent of total imports of iron ore concentrates (Dominguez: 27). Strategic partnership 
embraces more than economic ties and the growth of trade and investment. It gives political 
backing that both parties seek in relations with the US. Their political consensus on the US is 
that there has to be a more constrained role for the US, and therefore, they need to a stronger 
and more influential place in international affairs (Dominguez: 28). Their political aspiration 
is evident in their mutual support in the international political arenas. Brazil fully supported 
China’s bid to the WTO membership and recognized it as a ‘market economy’ thereafter. It 
also backed China’s bid for membership in the inter-American Development Bank. To the 
Brazilian cause in the similar efforts, president Hu also extended his country’s supportive 
stance on a Brazilian candidate to be director-manager of the WTO in his address to the 
Brazilian Congress during the 2004 visit (Paz 2006: 99). Growing political ties entailed 
economic consequences as the Brazilian Congress “cleared the way for bids by Chinese 
firms to invest in ports, railways, and roadways” (Dominguez: 28). 
Argentina’s partnership was also upgraded from “cooperative partner” to “strategic 
partner” in 2004. In a ten-year investment plan announced during his visit in 2005, Hu 
pledged to invest more than $19 billion in Argentina for infrastructure construction of the 
country, including an $8 million investment in the expansion of the Argentine railway 
system and $6 billion in other construction projects. 16
                                                          
16 “China plans to invest $19 B in Argentina,” Xinhuanet, November 17, 2004, accessed online at 
www.chinaview.cn on December 22, 2004. 
 Despite China’s efforts to woo 
Argentina by all and any means to further their economic ties, coupled with efforts to 
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improve political ties, they have yet to demonstrate the efficacy Beijing had hoped in part 
because of Argentina’s tradition to be pro-US in many areas, and in part because of its fears 
for the disadvantages the asymmetric economic structure may bring to it. Hence, before their 
economic differences surfaced, their political differences preceded in many negotiations both 
in bilateral and multilateral settings. Nevertheless, the bilateral trade in recent years (2000-
2005) enjoyed growth by three times. 
Chile has been the most visited Latin American nations by Chinese top leaders. Since 
former president Yang’s visit in 1990, former president Jiang visited twice in 1993 and 1997, 
and the current president Hu in 2004. Reciprocally, every Chilean president visited Beijing 
since 1990-1992, 1995, and 2001. Pinochet as military commander-in-chief also visited 
China in 1993 and 1997. Moreover, Michelle Bachelete, the newly elected president in 2006, 
has also declared for continuity in his nation’s policy to China. During the political 
developmental discourse, China also supported Chile’s bid for non-permanent membership 
on the UN Security Council in 2003-04. In November 2005, China concluded its Latin 
American free trade agreement with Chile. China’s main economic interest in Chile is copper. 
It has promised to invest heavily in the mining sector to secure a steady and abundant 
provision.17
Mexico was one of the earliest Latin American states that recognized China in 1972, only 
second to Cuba. Since the normalization of relations in 1972, the relationship experienced a 
great magnitude of fluctuation. Strange enough, it enjoyed its peak during the Cold War era, 
and it is somewhat contrary to the post-Cold War period, full of controversial calls in relation 
to international affairs. The dark side of the relationship began to loom large in 1993 when 
the Mexican government imposed 1000 anti-dumping measures on Chinese goods 
(Dominguez: 38). Conflicts in trade relations eventually developed over into political ones. 
Out of fears of Chinese growing competition, Mexico would take the economic issues into 
political arena to challenge China issues such as human rights issue, Tibetan issue, and 
others alike. Nonetheless, Mexico as one of the leading economies in Latin America bears 
significant strategic meanings to China’s national interests. It is recognized as a strategic 
partner to China in 2004. The notion of partnership was not, however, appreciated by the Fox 
administration when it declared China as a competitor and not partner during Vice-president 
Zeng Qinghong’s visit in 2005.  
  
Beijing and Caracas signed numerous contracts to develop Venezuelan oil fields. 
Venezuela has been exporting 150,000 barrels per day of oil to China and intends to more 
than double the amount to 300,000 barrels in 2007. Furthermore, it was agreed that the 
supply will exceed 5,000,000 barrels within five years. It was a pledge to increase 
Venezuela’s supply of 15 to 20 percent of China’s imports in the future. Apart from energy 
resources, the cooperation between the two nations is quite active in technology transfer area. 
In 2005, Venezuela signed a deal with China to build and launch a satellite in 2008. During 
his visit to China in December 2004, Venezuelan president Chavez observed that the 
investment and trade agreements signed could generate $ 3 billion in 2005.18
                                                          
17 Rob Delaney, “China and Chile Begin Talks to Reduce Trade Tariffs (Update 2),” Bloomberg.com, 
January 26, 2005. 
 
18 Roger F. Noriega, “China’s Influence in the Western Hemisphere,” Testimony of Roger F. Noriega, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs before the House Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere, April 6, 2005, accessed online at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/ 
Apr/07-272076html on October 23, 2007.  




In development in other areas, a joint venture company between Ecuador and China 
agreed on the acquisition of EnCana Corporation’s oil and pipeline asset in 2005 for $1.42 
billion. 19
Brazil, Cuba, Argentina, and Chile in 2004 were selected as “Chinese group travelers’ 
destination,” or also known as “Approved Destination Status (ADS).” Cuba was the first 
Latin American nation to be granted of such a status in 2003. Mexico and Peru joined them 
in 2005. Regarding the Caribbean, China listed Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the 
Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana, St. Lucia, Dominica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Jamaica as tourist destinations. Nonetheless, they are yet to witness substantial numbers of 
Chinese tourists, and hence, the status seems to remain rather symbolic. This designation is 
politically significant and economically meaningful because it serves as a diplomatic tool for 
Beijing and selected nations can hope to realize millions of dollars in revenue per year 
(Dreyer 2006: 92). Expectations are high as China is speculated to become the fourth-largest 
source of outbound tourists by 2020 with more than 100 million people traveling abroad each 
year. 
 Bolivia invited China to develop its gas reserves. In the Caribbean, China is 
enticing, for instance, Dominica with $112 million investment at the expense of cutting off 
ties with Taiwan (Noriega 2007: 3). 
 
4.3. Multilateral cooperation approaches 
 
Through summit diplomacy and enhanced political ties at the bilateral level, China has 
been able to garner support from Latin American states. In the due process, China was able 
to effectively transform its national image, successfully replacing its threatening image with 
that of a responsible state, and more importantly, of a developing state. In return China has 
remained supportive to Latin America’s regionalization process over the years. In the age of 
globalization and regionalization, China has also proactively attempted to engage itself in the 
regionalization process of the region. Chinese efforts have paid off in a significant way in 
recent years. It has won an observer status in the Association for Latin American Integration, 
the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 
and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Among them, China succeeded in winning official admission to permanent observer status 
by the OAS in May 2004. China also joined new political dialogues and consultation 
mechanisms, such as the Andean Community, the Rio Group, and the South American 
common market, and Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR). In addition, China’s 
multilateral efforts goes beyond the region. With significant help from Brazil, China and 
Brazil together successfully organized the so-called G21 at the 2003 Cancun World Trade 
Organization ministerial meeting. With respect to its membership to IADB, China must 
fulfill the stipulation of a $200-300 million contribution to the Bank, and “pre-pay its 
International Development Association loans” (Noriega 2007: 3). 
In the global multilateral arenas, China and Latin America were able to cooperate at a 
new level. During the discussion discourse of the UN reforms, China made it known of its 
support to Brazil’s attempt to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council. It has also 
undertaken active participation in UN peacekeeping operations in the region. China’s 
deployment of 155 police officers to Haiti is by far the largest that China ever dispatched 
                                                          
19 Ministry of Commerce of China, February 22, 2007, accessed online at http://www.zhs.mofcom.gov. 
cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200702/20070204346971.html on March 2, 2007. 
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overseas to a UN mission, symbolizing the trust and confidence Latin America has in China.  
From 1992, China has participated in Non-alliance summit and it has been 11 years since. 
As a special guest, China has been active in Group-77 meetings since 1991. In March 1991, 
at the UN Environment and Development Conference, China suggested a ‘Group-77 Plus 
China’ dialogue. In addition, China has already been a long and active participant in the 
Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC). In addition, in 1997, the 
MERCOSUR-China Dialogue Forum was founded. In January and February 2005, Vice 
president Zeng Qinghong visited Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru, and attended the opening 
ceremony of the first ministerial-level meeting of the China-Caribbean Economy and Trade 
Co-operation Forum 2005.  
 
4.4. Zouchuqu (Going-out) strategy 
 
Zouchuqu strategy has in recent years been an impetus behind China’s improved relations 
with developing countries and Latin America in particular. It offers justification and legal 
grounds to its efforts for a greater economic engagement through investment with those 
states whose relationship is much improved as a consequence of summit meetings and 
bilateral efforts. The goals of the strategy are multifaceted. While it emphasizes the need to 
pursue this strategy to secure the resources to help its economy to sustain continuous growth, 
it also envisions its economy’s place in the world, especially in developing countries. 
Furthermore, it values the market opportunities in these states. It also encourages Chinese 
firms to go abroad to achieve these objectives. Moreover, it underscores Chinese 
government’s support to such endeavor by Chinese enterprises. At the same time, it also 
highlights the need for Chinese businesses to advance into the developed world through 
aforementioned multilateral efforts. 
In sum, the strategy can be viewed from two different perspectives. From the perspective 
of China’s advancement into developing countries, the purpose is obviously to pioneer new 
markets, to secure natural and strategic resources, and to help the economic development of 
developing countries in the end. With regards to the developed nations, the strategy is 
designed to overcome the obstacles and barriers that hinder China’s pursuit of high 
technology and related information and skills through direct engagement of Chinese firms in 
these nations. 
Thus far, China’s zouchuqu strategy has been most active and visible in Latin America. 
As of 2005, China’s non-financial investment in Latin America totaled $ 6.5 billion, making 
it the largest recipient of Chinese overseas investment which accounts for 52 percent of the 
total. China’s total stock of investment in the region stood at $11.5 billion. The Cayman 
Islands was the top recipient of Chinese investment at $8.9 billion, followed by the Virgin 
Islands with $ 1.98 billion. The next four largest host countries are Mexico at $141 million, 







Chinese advancement in both diplomacy and economic realms in Latin America has been 
a recent phenomenon. Although the bilateral relationship between China and Latin America 




began in the early 1970s, however, the development of the relationship has remained in most 
of time very much idle. It has not advanced as much as both parties desired due to historical 
reasons (e.g. China’s Cultural Revolution) and political reasons (e.g. US influence) (Zhang 
2007: 24). Soon after China’s engagement became visible first with frequent visits by the 
head of the state and later by high ranking officials, heated debates naturally arose in the 
American policymaking community and academia in order to find the Chinese true intention 
behind all these maneuvers. Thus far, the general mood in the US policy-making circle has 
been to look at the Chinese maneuver with much skepticism. It can be said the US reaction is 
natural since there had been no other external influence that advanced so fast and deep into 
its ‘backyard’ thanks to the efficacy of Monroe doctrine and since the independence of Latin 
American states after the second World War. 
Given this historical background, the US concern is not difficult to comprehend. It 
involves a critical question such as: Will China ever rise to challenge US influence in the 
region? Many will not agree that China will because China’s presence and influence is still 
marginal compared to those of the US. Under the assumption, this article has sought to 
deduce the cause of such concerns on the US part by examining the purposes and goals of 
Chinese Latin American policy in applying insights from Chinese policy to define issues at 
stake and strategies pursued by China. At least three important points have emerged to 
substantiate this study. First, it finds that the scope and range of Chinese engagement in Latin 
America and the Caribbean is still limited. The chance for China and Latin America to work 
together in military realm, for instance, is not realistic in the short- or mid-term perspective. 
US military presence in the region is simply unchallenged and therefore, very formidable. 
US’ military aid to Colombia alone, for instance, stands at $600 million a year. In addition, 
the US provided the region with $112 million in Foreign Military Financing, recording three 
consecutive years to exceed $100 million.  
Second, Latin America’s economic dependence on the US is also far greater than on 
China. Notwithstanding its status as the largest export market for Latin American products, 
the US is by far the largest investor in the region, currently standing at $300 billion and 
compared to China’s $11.5 billion. Despite all the propagation of its investment plan, China 
has yet to sufficiently follow up with action, thereby losing much credential from the Latin 
American states. On the contrary, it is very much regarded as the main cause for industrial 
hauling in many of these states. 
Third, it is true that there has been a growing tendency among the Latin American states 
to hedge China against the US in pursuit of their interests, especially political one. China and 
Latin America do share interests in many aspects of the world affairs, ranging from new 
international order to poverty reduction. Although in many cases, the voting behavior of 
Latin American states at the UN would be more congruent with the US than China, it has 
been worrisome in the eyes of Washington in recent years. For example, what took the US 
by surprise was that Chile and Mexico opposed a resolution endorsing the invasion of Iraq in 
2003. Even Colombia also opposed. The more surprising fact is that the former two nations 
are regarded by the US as its traditional strong allies, yet they went against it.20
Four, Washington does not have to be too concerned about China’s growing ties with 
 
                                                          
20 Only El Salvador has troops in Iraq, and “very few Latin American countries support the Iraq war.” 
Sebastian Edwards, “Will the US ‘lose’ Latin America?” Project Syndicate, November 7, 2005, 
accessed online at http: //www.project-syndicate.org/print_commentary/edwards4/English on October 
11, 2007. 
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Latin America for power asymmetry reasons.21 Or as David Lampton would put it, it is “a 
subject of concern” but “not a crisis” (Lampton 2005: 4). Left-wing leaders of Latin 
American states will not be troubling, either. To the contrary of what has been depicted in 
the media, only four nations have a left-wing leader out of 33 nations. Stories of leaders like 
Chavez and others left-wing leaders and their relationships with China are often 
overemphasized, and sometimes exaggerated,22 because leaders of these states still depend 
on the US as a source of legitimacy (Horta 2008).23
Nevertheless, this study as a preliminary one inherently bears some noteworthy 
limitations. How the dynamics of bilateral relations between China and the US will, for 
instance, influence China’s Latin American policy. China’s Latin American policy report is a 
mere extension of its policy toward developing countries. Hence, the strategies employed to 
pursue policy goals and interests do not seem to be much different from the traditional ways 
of improving relations with those once neglected. How America’s relations with the Latin 
American states and/or region are factored in China’s policy-making process is another topic 
that deserves further analysis. How Latin American states perceive China’s rise is also a 
question that could entail significant strategic implications to understanding the dynamics of 
China-US-Latin American relations.  
 Their legitimacy pertains to the success 
of, not military expansion or influence based on such, but national development, which still 
heavily depends on the US market and assistance. Latin America, indeed, is at a critical 
juncture, a critical crossroads. Its international profile is undergoing a serious transformation 
with economic recovery. Its economic importance as a major supplier of raw materials and 
natural and energy resources that are very much sought by the world has promoted its 
economic status, endowing it with much greater leverage. Hence, the bilateral relationship 
between China and Latin America will not be a challenging issue to the regional order but 
will be an issue of adjustment to meet their mutual benefits and interests. Implication of such 
adjustment will be great if they can turn their relationship into a mutually beneficial one in 
light of new international order. Continuous promotion of mutual understanding and 
deepening interdependence will have a gravitational effect on cooperation towards their 
world outlook to the extent that will be worrisome to the rest of the world, but only in the 
long-term. 
Given the implications of China’s growing engagement and ensuing influence in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and the increased possibility that China and the regions may 
pursue interest-oriented diplomacy, it is hoped that the preliminary analysis will spur more 
research about this topic. This article suggests several future avenues in the field of Sino-
Latin American relations. The influence of enhanced bilateral relationship appears to be on 
the rise in America’s strategic thinking on its backyard. Assessing the degree of the influence 
                                                          
21 Malik, “China’s Growing Involvement in Latin America,” p. 6. 
22 Humphrey Hawksley, “US Alarm at China’s Latin Influence,” BBC, April 1, 2006, accessed online 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/4865122stm on May 2, 2006. 
23 One such prominent article in recent time argues that Chavez and neighboring states are aligning to 
secure the survival of their regimes and expand influence in the region through the expansion of 
military means including procurement of military weapons from China, Russia, Spain, and others as 
well as communists insurgents in Columbia, for instance. They could act as a source of instability and 
further exacerbate their relationship with the US. That is one side of the story of a coin, however, and 
the other side of the coin still tells us the importance of their reliance on the US for their energy 
resource-driven economy.  




generated from the development of the bilateral relationship and the manner in which it 
exerts will be critical to understanding the dynamic of the trilateral relationship and its 
influence on the Sino-American relations in the region in the future, given the formation of 
such trilateral relationship in the region. 
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